Ghana backs five-year presidency for future leaders

Five. That is the number that would redefine power in Ghana if the government's latest constitutional package becomes law — five years instead of four for every future president and every future Parliament, a full extra year in office per term, a 25% lengthening of the time any winning government gets to rule before it must face voters again ^{2 3 5}.

On July 30, 2026, at the Government Accountability Series held at Jubilee House, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice Dr. Dominic Ayine presented the government's White Paper position on the recommendations of the Constitution Review Committee, a body set up in 2025 by President John Dramani Mahama ^{4 7}. The White Paper did not change one rule in isolation. It accepted a bundle of reforms that together would touch term length, who can run, who can hold public office, and how local power is chosen ^{4 7}.

The centre of that bundle is the term extension. Both the presidency and Parliament would move from four-year terms to five-year terms under the government's accepted position ^{2 3 5 6}. The government's stated rationale, as reported by MyJoyOnline, is that the current four-year cycle "does not provide enough time for governments to effectively implement their programmes" ⁵. In a country where elections are fiercely contested and the first year is often spent settling in while the last year is spent campaigning, that argument will be familiar to anyone who has watched a Ghanaian administration race the calendar ⁵.

Crucially, the reporting is explicit that the longer term would not lengthen anyone's current mandate. It would apply only to future Presidents and future Parliaments ². Minister for Government Communications Felix Kwakye Ofosu clarified that the term extension will not apply to incumbent President John Dramani Mahama ⁸. That distinction matters because term changes in Africa are so often read as incumbent projects, and here the government, on the record available, has drawn a line between a rule for successors and a benefit for the sitting officeholder ^{2 8}.

Beyond time in office, the package would widen the door to the highest office by age. The government accepted lowering the minimum age for the presidency to 35 ^{3 6}. The change would bring Ghana in line with a continent-wide push to make presidential eligibility reflect much younger populations, and it would open contestation a full life-stage earlier for a generation that has so far mostly watched presidential races from the margins ^{3 6}.

On citizenship, the White Paper goes further than a narrow parliamentary fix. Dual citizens would be eligible for public office, but barred from the presidency and vice presidency, and the renunciation requirement for citizens by birth would be removed ¹¹. That is broader than simply allowing dual citizens to stand for Parliament. It keeps the very top two offices reserved while removing a longstanding disability on Ghanaians who hold another nationality alongside their Ghanaian citizenship by birth ¹¹.

On local power, the government accepted election of District Chief Executives, rather than presidential appointment ^{7 10}. In Ghana's system, the MMDCEs are the hinge between Accra and the districts, and presidential appointment has long made them answer upward to the president rather than downward to voters. Direct election would be the most tangible decentralization in the package, changing not how long Accra rules but who local people can hold to account day to day ^{7 10}.

The White Paper also reaches beyond elections and offices. Other accepted reforms include abolition of the death penalty, a citizen-initiative mechanism for constitutional amendments, and a review of the size and composition of government ¹⁰. Taken together, they suggest a review that was not designed as a single-term story but as a broader attempt to revisit controls on state power, from punishment to popular initiative to the shape of the executive itself ¹⁰.

What happens next is procedural and unscheduled. No referendum date has been set, and the changes must go through the constitutional amendment process ². All of the core reporting is from July 30, 2026 ^{2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11}, with one follow-up on August 9, 2026 detailing additional accepted reforms ¹⁰. That timeline leaves the substance accepted by Cabinet but not yet enacted, and the mechanism, timetable, and sequencing still to be laid out in public ^{2 10}.

Read plainly, the package pulls in two directions, and that is why it deserves scrutiny rather than applause or alarm. Measures that push power outward — electing local chiefs, letting dual citizens serve, letting citizens initiate amendments, reconsidering the size of government — sit alongside a measure that lets whoever wins national power keep it longer each time ^{7 10 11 2}. One extra year can mean more time to deliver roads, schools, and budgets without permanent campaigning. It can also mean one more year before voters get to render a verdict. Both things are true at once, which is why the scope limitation to future holders, and the integrity of the amendment process itself, will carry so much weight ^{2 5 8}.